Monday, January 9, 2012

A Hateful Outrage: Media Assault on the Santorum Family


A Hateful OutragePrintE-mail
By Robert Royal   
MONDAY, 09 JANUARY 2012
Electoral politics is dirty business. Most decent people would have nothing to do with it – if there were any other reasonable way to select leaders in modern democracies. But even in popular election campaigns, there are limits. And last week those limits were crossed in unbelievably crass ways out of ideological hatred towards presidential candidate Rick Santorum.
         Even some of the media figures who defended him, like Ross Douthat in the New York Times, have been so sucked into the bad habits of the neighborhood that Douthat concludes Santorum shouldn’t complain:  “In a culture as divided about fundamental issues as our own, the kind of weird attacks that Rick Santorum is enduring come with the vocation he has chosen.”
Weird is putting it mildly. For once, Douthat’s colleague at the Times, Maureen Dowd, was comparatively modest, just mocking Santorum for his “antediluvian abrasiveness” on moral questions like homosexuality. For La Dowd, the moral sentiments of the whole human race in virtually every age and culture until quite recently – that homosexuality is a moral aberration – is merely some collective delusion, now remedied by the superior moral delicacy of our day. And the opinions of teenagers in New Hampshire campaign events prove it.
The really weird stuff came out last week beginning with Alan Colmes(who later apologized) and Eugene Robinson (who didn’t really – and you can see on the Internet by Googling him how slander spreads beyond anyone’s ability to recall). They weren’t content with criticizing Santorum’s traditional Catholic morals and conservative economics and politics. That’s too much like regular campaign commentary. 
After Iowa, Santorum had to be destroyed. They attacked the Santorum family’s bringing home the body of their child, who died shortly after birth, as something incomparably bizarre, like the Mexican cult of death.
Actually, I think both commentators, politically correct liberals, would have commended a brief visit with a dead child as a humane alternative to the American bourgeoisie’s denial of death – if it had been practiced in another, non-American culture.
Instead, despite the fact, as was later reported, that several American medical groups recommend such closure, some of our most prestigious media figures felt they were authorized to wade into this sad story because it confirmed just how weird those traditional Catholics and their cult of the fetus really are – and the voting public ought to know it.
And then there was the story put out by several pro-abortion groups that the Santorums chose to abort the child when Mrs. Santorum had complications during the pregnancy. The implication, of course, is that they’re hypocrites, like all pro-lifers, and jettison their principles when it’s convenient.
The truth, however, was that the pregnancy was one of those hard cases anticipated by and quite well thought through in Catholic medical ethics. Both mother and child were going to die if an infection was not treated with antibiotics, which had the potential to induce labor. 

            Closure and memorial: Victorian kids photographed with a dead sibling
The political perspective on these sorts of situations is quite crude. We hear about the need for abortion exceptions in cases of “rape, incest, and life of the mother.” But these are not at all the same thing morally. Rape and incest are sexual crimes, but a child conceived as a result does not merit destruction in the womb.
Questions of “life of the mother” are more complicated. Some abortion advocates think the phrase means everything from a pregnancy that will kill the woman to missing a semester abroad during college. 
In more serious analysis, where a mother’s life really is threatened by a problem pregnancy, it’s morally licit in certain circumstances to save her life and, indirectly, cause the death of the fetus. In the ethical literature, this is called the principle of double effect – a situation will produce two undesired outcomes, so you choose one good goal accepting, but not intending, the unfortunate secondary effect that will follow.
Many people don’t understand this especially as applied to problem pregnancies. A doctor, a former president of the St. Luke’s Physician Guild in Washington, told me years ago that his colleagues at a local hospital would mock him for performing “abortions” in such cases, even though he was a vocal opponent of abortion.
No amount of explanation on his part had any effect on the other doctors. They have been brainwashed to think that abortion is just a certain medical procedure. It’s all the same, medically, whatever motives or rationalizations you attach to the brute fact.
Politicians are even more obtuse about such things. We might have expected that Nancy Pelosi, former speaker of the House, and Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, both of whom attended Catholic schools – and Trinity College in Washington – would have heard something about double effect. But both seem instead to have heard only about female autonomy – i.e., the right to choose to kill babies – during their Catholic educations. Sebelius recently spoke to a NARAL Pro-Choice fundraiser about “the war” they are in – together. And Pelosi has argued that repealing Obamacare’s abortion provisions may kill women.
It’s not surprising that wild charges such as that the Santorums are “weird” and had an “abortion” are plausible to some very ignorant people. But those who put in motion such vicious and patently false attacks on a campaigning politician bear grave moral responsibilities. 
There’s plenty to debate about Santorum’s record and vision (He made a troubling mistake in supporting pro-abortion Senator Arlen Specter a few years ago to preserve the Republican majority). But you can oppose someone’s politics without hateful smears. 
Further, Santorum’s socially conservative views – coupled, be it said, with some real compassion for the unfortunate, which have been criticized by some conservatives as “big government conservatism” – were popular in Iowa and also resonate with tens of millions of Catholic, evangelical, Orthodox Jewish, and Muslim voters. 
Painting those views, once the standard throughout the entire country, as somehow “weird” divides the American populace unnecessarily in hatred, and we will not be easily healed.

Robert Royal is editor-in-chief of The Catholic Thing, and president of the Faith & Reason Institute in Washington, D.C. His most recent book is
 The God That Did Not Fail: How Religion Built and Sustains the West, now available in paperback from Encounter Books.

© 2012 The Catholic Thing. All rights reserved. For reprint rights, write to:info@frinstitute.org
Retrieved January 9, 2012 from http://www.thecatholicthing.org/

Sunday, January 8, 2012

Media Anti-Catholic Bias in Covering Primaries


Three days ahead of the New Hampshire primary, ABC moderated yet another debate Saturday night among the GOP candidates. Questioners asked about the economy and foreign policy. But they provoked candidates pointedly on social moral issues. In response, they got an earful.


Especially from Newt Gingrich.


He seized the opportunity to blast the media for anti-Christian bias. Which moderators teed up with their pointed questions.

New Hampshire TV’s anchor Josh McElveen first posed the question to former Pennsylvania Senator Rick 


Santorum:
“Your position on same-sex adoption, obviously, you are in favor of traditional families, but are you going to tell someone they belong in — as a ward of the state or in foster care, rather than have two parents who want them?”

Mr Santorum answered, “My — my feeling is that this is an issue that should be — I believe the issue of marriage itself is a federal issue, that we can’t have different laws with respect to marriage. We have to have one law. Marriage is, as Newt said, a foundation institution of our country, and we have to have a singular law with respect to that. We can’t have somebody married in one state and not married in another.”
“Once we — if we were successful in establishing that, then this issue becomes moot…

Speaker Gingrich, however, answered the question another way asking the media:
“I just want to raise — since we’ve spent this much time on these issues — I just want to raise a point about the news media bias. You don’t hear the opposite question asked. Should the Catholic Church be forced to close its adoption services in Massachusetts because it won’t accept gay couples, which is exactly what the state has done? Should the Catholic Church be driven out of providing charitable services in the District of Columbia because it won’t give in to secular bigotry?”

He went further:
“Should the Catholic Church find itself discriminated against by the Obama administration on key delivery of services because of the bias and the bigotry of the administration?


“The bigotry question goes both ways. And there’s a lot more anti-Christian bigotry today than there is concerning the other side. And none of it gets covered by the news media.”


Mitt Romney noted that Massachusetts Catholic Charities was out of the adoption business because of the Church’s fundamental beliefs. Rick Perry jumped in and criticized the Obama administration for stigmatizing Catholic Charities because of its principles on marriage and abortion, driving them out of important social services.


At the end of the debate, ABC moderators George Stephanopoulos and Diana Sawyer turned to a panel of pundits in their studios for analysis. She addressed one of them saying ‘You’ve spent a lot of time covering these charac….’ and then caught herself and adjusted her comments and said ‘covering these candidates’…and proceeded to ask the question.


The candidates debate again on NBC Sunday morning.


Retrieved January 8, 2012 from http://www.mercatornet.com/sheila_liaugminas/view/10142

Same-sex marriage and religious liberty



Posted Tue, August 16th, 2011 9:08 am

Same-sex marriage and religious liberty
The following piece for our same-sex marriage symposium is written by Thomas C. Berg, James L. Oberstar Professor of Law and Public Policy at the University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota).  He has written numerous articles on religion, law, and constitutional law; four books, including Religion and the Constitution (Aspen, with McConnell and Garvey) and The State and Religion in a Nutshell (ThomsonReuters); and many briefs in the Supreme Court and appellate courts.
——
Civil recognition of same-sex marriage is spreading.  Four state legislatures, plus the District of Columbia, and one state court have successfully taken the step, with more likely to follow.  Arguments against gay marriage have declined in public appeal in recent years; warnings that it will undermine marriage seem abstract to more and more people in the face of same-sex couples pursuing committed relationships and raising children.
The question in Perry v. Schwarzenegger and Windsor v. United States is whether this emerging situation should lead the courts "“ ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court "“ to declare opposite-sex-only marriage unconstitutional.  To say that same-sex civil marriage should be recognized does not mean, of course, that judges should require it under the Constitution.
In making that distinction, one could raise arguments about proper methods of constitutional interpretation, or warn about political blowback that aggressive judicial decisions can trigger (as even some pro-choice observers have remarked about Roe v. Wade).  I focus, however, on a different reason for the Court to tread gently in Perry: the religious liberty of traditionalist objectors to gay marriage, and how legislative recognition of marriage may be a better vehicle than judicial rulings for balancing religious liberty and gay rights.  (I belong to a group of scholars, including symposium participant Robin Wilson, who have proposedmodel religious- accommodation provisions to legislatures considering same-sex marriage; my opinions here should not be attributed to those colleagues.)
For all of Judge Walker's lengthy fact-finding in Perry, he utterly fails to take religious-liberty issues seriously.  He notes that "[p]rior to Proposition 8, no religious group was required to recognize marriage for same-sex couples."  That is true about the church wedding, but there are many other potential conflicts (detailed, for example, here).  Antidiscrimination and public-accommodation laws in California and other states could force many religious non-profits to give direct assistance to marriages or ceremonies that violate their tenets.  Catholic Charities ceased providing adoptions in Massachusetts and, to a large extent, San Francisco because it faced being compelled to place children in same-sex households.  A religious college that provides married-student housing might violate state law if it refused to house same-sex married couples.  These groups can face civil liability or the loss of generally available government benefits such as tax exemptions or licenses.
Marriage ceremonies also affect small businesses "“ wedding planners, caterers "“ in which individuals directly lend their personal skills to facilitate marriages.  An Albuquerque, New Mexico, wedding photographer had to pay more than $6600 in legal fees for declining to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony.  In short, religious liberty is a context where gay marriage may affect others directly.
The adoption and photographer cases arose before same-sex marriage, under preexisting laws against sexual-orientation discrimination.  (As Judge Walker notes, California already recognizes domestic partnerships and prohibits discrimination against them.)  But recognizing same-sex marriage without significant religious accommodations will multiply the conflicts, since some traditionalists have particular objections to marriages because of the term's religious significance.  Affirmative recognition of marriage, without accommodation, may also intensify the idea that opposition to homosexuality is so far beyond the pale that it deserves almost no accommodation.  Consider the race context: in Bob Jones University (1983) the Supreme Court held that the long list of laws against race discrimination, covering mainstream education and employment markets, showed the existence of a "firm national policy" that justified extending penalties against an insular fundamentalist college that surely had no effect in such markets.  There is plenty of reason to think that religious dissenters, organizations, and individuals will more frequently face the Hobson’s choice between directly facilitating same-sex marriages and giving up their charitable activities or livelihoods.
It is possible to minimize these conflicts: to protect religious liberty for many traditionalist dissenters while ensuring that gay couples have full ability in practice to marry and build families.  The Albuquerque couple presented no evidence they incurred costs in finding another wedding photographer in the phone book.  In Massachusetts, as Dale Carpenter has noted, "[g]ay couples could still adopt through dozens of other private agencies or through the state child-welfare services department itself."
As Robin Wilson's symposium contribution will detail, state legislatures that have enacted gay marriage have all acknowledged and accommodated religious-liberty concerns to some extent.  Some states have protected religious organizations beyond the immediate context of celebrating or hosting a marriage ceremony.  Others have protected fraternal societies, like the Knights of Columbus, that might object to hosting a wedding or reception.  New York protected, among other things, against depriving an organization of generally available government benefits such as tax exemptions or licenses.
Although some of these accommodations could have gone further, they still serve the purpose of reducing social conflict by letting both sides in the culture war "live and let live."  But before I turn to the relative roles of legislatures and courts in striking such balances, let me briefly add why recognizing gay marriage with significant religious-liberty protections is not just politically expedient but morally principled.  Even though gay marriage and religious liberty clash in particular disputes, the arguments for the two have important common features.  As I've argued elsewhere, the strongest arguments for recognizing same-sex civil marriage also support giving significant protection to religious dissenters.
Among the parallels, both same-sex couples and religious believers claim that their conduct stems from commitments central to their identity: love and fidelity to a life partner, faithfulness to the moral norms of God.  Gay couples claim that it is insensitive, even cruel, to tell them their conduct is separate from their orientation "“ but so too, religious believers claim it is insensitive to tell them they can keep their beliefs but can't act on them.  Both groups also claim that they should be able to live their commitments in a public way, touching all aspects of their lives.  Gay couples claim a right beyond private behavior "“ participation in the social institution of civil marriage "“ but so too do religious believers who seek to follow their faith not just in houses of worship, but in charitable efforts and in their daily work lives.
These arguments suggest that religious accommodation ought to protect not just churches and clergy, but also religious nonprofit organizations like Catholic Charities, in contexts beyond the ceremony itself such as adoption or marriage counseling.  Accommodation in the commercial sphere is typically more limited, but it can extend to small, personal businesses like the wedding photographer, with an exception in cases "“ for example, small rural markets "“ where one religious objector’s refusal of services would cause a concrete hardship on the ability of the same-sex couple to marry.
Unfortunately, courts that have found a constitutional right to same-sex marriage have been blind to the range of religious-liberty issues.  Like Judge Walker, the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage Cases (2008) found that same-sex civil marriage "will not impinge upon the religious freedom of" anyone, for two reasons: "no religion will be required to change its religious policies or practices with regard to same-sex couples, and no religious officiant will be required to solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs."  The first reason overlooks the reach of antidiscrimination and public-accommodations laws; the second indefensibly limits religious-freedom concerns to the church ceremony and the clergyperson.
It's understandable that judges ruling on gay marriage would avoid opining on the whole range of possible conflicts with religious liberty.  Courts by nature discuss only the precise issues before them.  But the narrow judicial references also reflect that constitutional doctrine on the free exercise of religion has become quite weak.  Both the U.S. Supreme Court, in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), and the California Supreme Court, under the state constitution, have held that courts should not order an accommodation from "laws of general applicability" that are formally neutral toward religion.  Presumably, this includes laws prohibiting discrimination against same-sex couples.
Therefore, once the California Supreme Court ordered same-sex marriage, voters could understandably lack any confidence that religious-liberty concerns would ultimately be addressed and given weight.  In that context, I believe, voters had a rational basis for rejecting same-sex marriage.  As the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty argued in an amicus brief in Perry, "Since the California Supreme Court left Californians with an all-or-nothing choice between same-sex marriage and full protection for the rights of conscience, Proposition 8 was an entirely rational response to the threat to religious liberty."  Concern for religious liberty in no way amounts to irrational bigotry or prejudice; it stems from a fundamental value in our constitutional and political system.  That courts are unwilling to protect religious exercise vigorously in constitutional cases is a reason for "“ not against "“ protection of that right through political decisions (the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith expressly invited the political branches to accommodate religion).
Although I think Proposition 8 was therefore rational, it would be fairer to all to recognize gay marriage and accommodate religious liberty.  The record shows that legislatures have done better than courts in striking this balance.  That makes sense for institutional reasons: while a court focuses on the case before it, a legislature can take evidence on the range of situations that might be affected by its action.  One by one in recent years, legislatures have acted as "laboratories of experimentation" and provided data, however imperfect, on how best to balance religious liberty with access to marriage.  I believe that legislative superiority in striking such balances is one reason why legislation recognizing same-sex marriage is preferable to constitutional decision-making "“ preferable especially to a single decision by the U.S. Supreme Court requiring equal marriage in all fifty states.
If courts declare gay-marriage rights, however "“ whether state courts or the U.S. Supreme Court "“ they must do a better job on religious liberty than they have so far.  They should expressly acknowledge the broad range of potential conflicts.  And if they are not going to order religious accommodations as constitutional mandates, they should expressly encourage state legislatures to consider them as wise policy.
Recommended Citation: Thomas C. Berg, Same-sex marriage and religious liberty, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 16, 2011, 9:08 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/same-sex-marriage-and-religious-liberty/
posted here under Creative Commons license http://bit.ly/18QrC6
PA:  Many proponents of SSM deny that legal recognition has implications for the rest of society.  "If you don't like SSM, don't get married to another person of the same sex"--a familiar argument heard in abortion discussions or at least seen on pro-abortion bumper stickers.  It is easy enough to refute the point in the case of abortion, which always takes the life of an innocent human being and so violates a basic duty of the state to protect innocent life.  It is also clear from actions of professional bodies like American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), and the new Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)'s funding of abortion and rules mandating insurance coverage of abortions and abortifacient drugs, that such assurances are worthless.  In the case of SSM, as the above essay from the SCOTUS [Supreme Court of the United States] blog argues, many recent court actions show the increasing readiness of courts to override conscience protections and concerns.  

Friday, January 6, 2012

Liberalism, Marriage, and the New Intolerance


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By Francis J. Beckwith   
FRIDAY, 06 JANUARY 2012

Political Liberalism, as we know it today, is not even three decades old. It began to develop in the early 1980s in the writings of several well-known philosophers that included Thomas Nagel, Ronald Dworkin, and John Rawls. The purpose of their project was to offer the political culture an intellectually respectable way to sequester the policy goals of the fledgling movement of religious conservatives while at the same time claiming that their project is consistent with an older liberalism that allows for full political participation by all citizens.
The Political Liberal correctly observes that the differences between citizens on the culture-owar issues – e.g., abortion, marriage, euthanasia – stem from their contrary, though reasonable, worldviews or comprehensive doctrines (as Rawls would put it). Rawls concedes that his understanding of “reasonable” is “deliberately loose.”
“We avoid excluding doctrines as unreasonable,” writes Rawls, “without strong grounds based on clear aspects of the reasonable itself. Otherwise our account runs the danger of being arbitrary and exclusive.Political liberalism counts many familiar and traditional doctrines – religious, philosophical, and moral – as reasonable, even though we could not seriously entertain them for ourselves. . . .” (Emphasis added)
So, for example, the prolifer opposes abortion because he believes that all human beings, including the unborn, are by nature persons and thus have intrinsic dignity regardless of their size, level of development, environment, or degree of dependency. 
The typical prochoicer, on the other hand, maintains that not all human beings are persons, because a person is a being who has the present capacity to exercise certain person-making functions like self-consciousness, rationality, the ability to communicate and have desires, and so forth. Because the fetus for most of its gestation lacks these functions, it is not a person and thus it is permissible to abort it. 
Both positions, according to the Political Liberal, are reasonable, for they are derived from reasonable comprehensive doctrines and neither is unassailable. Thus, it would be as equally unjust for the government to coerce a prochoice citizen to carry a pregnancy to term as it would be for it to coerce a prolife citizen to procure an abortion. This is because a citizen cannot be coerced on a matter of fundamental rights based on reasons he is reasonable to reject.
Political Liberalism’s sole purpose, we are told, is to accommodate citizen diversity on these contested questions while nurturing a political culture of respect and tolerance, the latter of which would be reflected in the government’s restraint in coercing and marginalizing citizens based on where they stand on these contested questions.
The question lurking in the debate over whether or not marriage law should recognize same-sex couples seems almost like a paradigm case of the sort of dispute for which Political Liberalism was invented: what is the proper function of our sexual powers and its relationship to the nature of marriage? 
How one answers this question is inexorably tied to what one understands to be true about the nature of men and women, the conjugal act, and the permanence of the marital bond. Such understandings, to conscript Rawls, are informed by those “many familiar and traditional doctrines – religious, philosophical, and moral” that Political Liberalism counts “as reasonable.” 
Thus, it would seem to be inconsistent with Political Liberalism to allow any government coercion and marginalization of citizens who, as a matter of conscience (often grounded in religious conviction), cannot acquiesce to the legitimacy of same-sex marriage. 
Consider just one example. In Massachusetts, soon after the state’s Supreme Judicial Court in 2003 required that the state issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, Catholic Charities, which was at the time in the child adoption business, was told by the state that it could no longer exclude same-sex couples as adoptive parents, even though the Catholic Church maintains that same-sex unions are deeply disordered and sinful. Because it could not as a matter of conscience compromise its moral theology, Catholic Charities ceased putting children up for adoption.
Catholic Charities believes that its mission is to find for each child under its care an adequate replacement for her mother and father. This is grounded in the belief that a human child is the sort of being that has by nature a mother and a father, just as it is the sort of being that has the essential property to exercise rational thought (even if it never acquires the ability to exercise it). 
Thus, if we have an obligation not to interrupt a child’s ability to exercise rational thought, we also have an obligation not to deny unjustly a child her mother and father. Because Catholic Charities believes it is morally required to treat all children with equal dignity and respect, this means that no child should be denied a mother and a father or a replacement for each if it is in fact possible to do so. 
Including same-sex couples as adoptive parents, according to Catholic Charities, violates the equal dignity and respect of the children who have been placed in its care. Although everyone does not share this perspective, it is certainly just the sort of reasonable comprehensive doctrine that Political Liberalism is supposed to protect.
But as we have seen since 2003, everything from public education, to rental law, to employment law, to family law, to government funding and to the tax-exempt status of religious academic institutions falls within the orbit of a state’s interest in making sure that same-sex marriage dissenters are coerced, punished, or marginalized if they refuse to treat same-sex marriage as licit as male-female marriage. 
Thus, the Political Liberal, if he wants to remain consistent, should stand in solidarity with those who dissent from same-sex marriage. 


Francis J. Beckwith is Professor of Philosophy and Church-State Studies at Baylor University. He is one of four primary contributors to the forthcoming Journeys of Faith: Evangelicalism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Anglicanism (Zondervan, 2012). 

© 2012
 The Catholic Thing. All rights reserved. For reprint rights, write to: info@frinstitute.org

Retrieved January 6, 2011 from http://www.thecatholicthing.org/?task=view

Thursday, January 5, 2012

Media Bias and Falsely Accused Priests


Today at Catholic World Report, Dave Pierre discusses his work exposing anti-Catholic bias in media coverage of the sexual abuse of minors, which often treats accused priests as “guilty until proven innocent” and distorts public perception of where exactly children today are in most danger of abuse.
In an exclusive interview with CWR, Pierre—a contributor to the media-watchdog blog NewsBusters.org and author of several books—argues: “We must continue to demand justice and compassion to victims of clergy abuse. This is not optional. However, the demand for honesty, fairness, and perspective in the reporting of the Catholic Church abuse narrative is a separate matter.”
Pierre points to the fact that while major media outlets frequently down-play or ignore accusations of child abuse occurring in public schools, a 2004 report from the US Department of Education found that “nearly 9.6 percent of [public school] students are targets of educator sexual misconduct sometime during their school career.”
“Another section of that report chronicled an early 1990s study that revealed that zero of 225 cases of teacher sex abuse in New York were reported to police,” says Pierre. “Two hundred and twenty-five abusers. None of them reported to police. By all measures, this would be defined as a cover-up. Yet the media has never seemed too motivated to follow up on this.”

Tuesday, January 3, 2012

We Are Catholic

Thank you, Fr. Henry, for this link to the Diocese of Lancaster in England.  (Lancashire was the heart of English recusancy--loyalty to the Old Faith in face of Protestant persecution over centuries.)  Rant alert!--After the past 40 years in the wilderness, years following Vatican II when the dominant trend was one of liberal-secular accommodationism; of a 'beige Catholicism,' as Fr. Barron calls it; the lost generation of uncatechized Catholics abandoned by clergy who seemed embarrassed by their faith and its visible signs, who treated the Church's teaching on faith and morals as optional or obsolete; who brought scandal on the Church by their own immorality; who wrought destruction through translations of the Missal and Bible that stripped the sacred language of its poetry and substituted the language of the instruction manual (talk about a dead language!); stripped the altars; discouraged the devotional practices of the faithful; produced travesties of church architecture, liturgy, and music...

--after all that, what a joy it is to see the resurgence of a Faith that is strong and confident, priests and nuns who are not afraid to look like men and women dedicated to God and his Church and accessible to those who need them.  In England, my home country where Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular are generally regarded with indifference or hostility, where persecution and prejudice against the Church are deep-rooted and flourished for centuries even before their current militant-atheist form, it is wonderful to see the Diocese of Lancaster stand strong and proud for the Faith of our fathers, holy faith.

St. Michael the Archangel, defend us in battle.

January 3rd, 2012Confident Presentation Of The FaithBY FR. SIMON HENRY

I can't recall when I last - if ever - went to an English diocesan website and thought, "Wow, that's really good!" But if you go the the Diocese of Lancaster site the home page greets you with this video unashamedly announcing who and what the Catholic Faith is. Words and claims for the Church not seen in ages are boldly announced:

We are sacred
We are obedience
We are joy
We are tradition
We are happy
We are Papists
We are universal
We are strong
We are sacred
We are courageous
We are defenders of the Faith

... to name but a few.
The accompanying music is full-on modern and upbeat. All the images are not afraid of showing Catholics acting and dressed as Catholics - nuns, priests, marked with the Lenten ashes, Pro-Life - all positive and highlighting the vigour, youth, tradition, beauty, grandeur and struggle of the Church.

This is the sort of publicity we should be focusing on, a confident, joyful message embracing ALL of the Church's Tradition. If only we could have more like this instead of the mediocre, insipid and lowest common denominator offerings usually served up. Who knows, perhaps this sort of presentation might actually attract people to the Faith.

Confidence in the Faith and its message is something that I think has been lacking in recent times. After the turmoil induced in the years following the Second Vatican Council the great hopes the modernisers held out for did not materialise - quite the opposite. The secular media is always ready to bash the Church on premises that are occasionally real but usually false or exaggerated. Many Catholics hardly seem to know what we are for and so no wonder we have trouble telling others why they should join up - why it might be imperative that they join up. Bishops, priests and laity, certainly in the Western world, seem to have lost confidence in the power of the message and so the temptation has been t0 compromise it and fit in - in how we look, in how we think, in how we act, even in how we worship. It's only now with a new generation is more confident - not disappointed by the lack of "success" after the Second Vatican Council because they never experienced the let down feeling - only saw their elders rather tired and a bit lost for words - or at least words that meant anything. Confidence doesn't have to mean Triumphalism - it can just mean confidence that the Church really is guided by the Holy Spirit. It is now and it always has been - even before Vatican II and even (if not especially!) in the election of Pope Benedict!

Well done Lancaster Diocese!
Retrieved from http://www.staustinreview.com/ink_desk/archives/confident_presentation_of_the_faith/

Another View of Christopher Hitchens

Good points, but perhaps Hitch is too "freshly dead" himself for this kind of critique.  De mortuis nil nisi bonum.  For a more charitable view, see Fr. Barron's commentary on his Word on Fire site and below.


Fine wit in the service of plain hatred
by Fr. Raymond J. de Souza
Christopher Hitchens is dead. By his own lights, he is utterly defunct, decomposing more rapidly than yesterday’s newspaper. I take a different view, and do sincerely pray for a merciful judgment. In the mean time, I trust that his soul, even now, is chagrined with the extravagant evasions that marked his death. My colleagues were enthusiastic contributors. Our editorial board praised his “courage” as a journalist and deemed him the “greatest columnist and essayist in the English-speaking world.” The estimable David Frum wrote that, “If moral clarity means hating cruelty and oppression, then Christopher Hitchens was above all things a man of moral clarity.”


Clarity he had. But hating cruelty? He was himself both hateful and cruel. Upon Bob Hope’s death, Hitchens wrote that he was a “fool, and nearly a clown.” When Ronald Reagan died, Hitchens called him a “stupid lizard,” “dumb as a stump” and “an obvious phony and loon.” On Mother Teresa: “The woman was a fanatic and a fundamentalist and a fraud, and millions of people are much worse off because of her life, and it’s a shame there is no hell for your bitch to go to.”


The sadness is that there is a hell for Hitch to go to. He was granted a long farewell, with the opportunity for reconsiderations and reconciliations with those he hated and those he hurt. He declined to take advantage of it. Mother Teresa is fine, and no doubt prays for her enemies, including that Hitchens would be delivered both from hell and the nihilistic oblivion, which he thought awaited him.

“He was a virtuoso hater and his hatreds were redeemed, when they had to be, by the sheer relish with which they were expressed,” wrote Michael Ignatieff upon his death.
For many of Hitchens’ fellow journalists, the virtuosity of his brilliant writing and bracing conversation earned him a pass on the hatred. But hatred it remained. His commercial genius was to harbour hatreds sufficiently vast and varied that a lucrative constituency could be found to relish all of them.
In the first of his elegant essays about the ravages of his terminal cancer, he wrote about the consequences of his abbreviated future: “Will I really not live to see my children married? To read — if not indeed write — the obituaries of elderly villains like Henry Kissinger and Joseph Ratzinger?” The Scriptures in which Hitchens did not believe say that love is stronger than death. Maybe he thought hatred was, too.
He desired to live that he might trash the freshly dead.

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